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Abstract  
  
Purpose 
This article studies effects of mandatory inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) in small 
Italian municipalities. Data from 280 small Italian municipalities on effects of IMC in 
terms of higher efficiency, better effectiveness of local public services, and greater 
institutional legitimacy of the small municipalities participating in IMC have been 
investigated against four variables: size; geographical area; type of inter-municipal 
integration and IMC membership (the presence in the IMC of a bigger municipality, the 
so-called big brother).  
 
Design/methodology/approach 
Data were gathered from a mail survey that was sent to a random sample of 1,360 chief 
financial officers acting in municipalities of under 5,000 inhabitants, stratified by size 
(0–1,000 and 1,001–5,000) and geographic area (North, Center, and South) criteria. To 
analyze dependency relationships between the three potential effects of participating in 
IMC and possible explanatory variables, we used a logistic regression model as the 
benefits were binarily categorized (presence or absence of benefits). 
 
Findings 
Findings show that in more than two-thirds of the municipalities participating in IMC 
there were benefits in terms of costs reduction and better public services, whereas 
greater institutional legitimacy was detected in about half of the cases. Our statistical 
analysis with logistic regression highlighted that IMC type is particularly critical for 
explaining successful IMC. In particular, positive effects of IMC were mainly detected 
in those small municipalities that promoted a service delivery organization rather than 
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participating in service delivery agreements or opting for mixed arrangements of joint 
public services delivery. 
  
 
Originality/value 
The paper focuses on small municipalities where studies are usually scant. Our analysis 
highlighted that the organizational setting is particularly critical for explaining 
successful IMC. 
 
Keywords:  
Inter-municipal cooperation, public service delivery, municipalities, public networks, 
austerity 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the last fifty years, in all European countries, municipalities – and especially 
smaller ones – have encountered increasing difficulties in satisfying the demands of 
citizens in public services delivery (e.g. Hulst & van Montfort, 2012). In this context, in 
order to deal with the challenge of delivering better public services with scarce financial 
resources, many governments have adopted policies for promoting inter-municipal 
cooperation (IMC)  to overcome the limit of sub-optimally sized historical municipal 
borders for an efficient and effective provision of local public services (e.g. Bel et al, 
2012; Blaeschke, 2014; Rayle & Zegras, 2013). Among others, the main benefits of 
joint provision of public services would include improvements from economies of scale 
and the internalization of some transaction costs.  
However, there is no unanimity over the fact that IMC actually brings savings 
and it should be remembered that with regard to inter-municipal cooperation there are 
significant concerns regarding accountability and transparency. Scholars, policy makers, 
and public managers have been extensively debating on what the conditions are that 
make IMC really work (e.g. Bel et al., 2010; Cristofoli & Markovic, 2016; Frere et al., 
2014). The aim of this article is to contribute on this issue by presenting an original 
research aimed at exploring some possible organizational and contextual variables of 
successful IMC in small Italian municipalities using logistic regression. The need for 
more studies on small municipalities has been explicitly identified as a gap to be filled 
in the literature (Mohr et al., 2010; Teles, 2016).  
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Since we are aware of the different meanings of IMC (e.g. Hulst et al., 2009), we 
follow in this article the definition provided by Steiner (2003, p. 553): IMC can be 
defined as “the fulfilment of a public municipal task by two or more municipalities 
jointly or by a third legal entity, whereby the task fulfilment simultaneously serves at 
least two municipalities and the participating municipalities participate directly 
(‘performing’) or indirectly (‘organizing’)”. It is important to highlight that IMC in the 
European context is different from the inter-municipal agreements typical of the US 
context (e.g. Holzer & Fry, 2011). Moreover, it is also important to point out that the 
focus of this paper is on IMC for the direct provision of public services, and not for 
other aims, such as, for example, contracting in and out (e.g. Brown, 2008) and/or for 
development and fundraising tasks (Goldkind & Pardasani, 2012). 
The structure of our article is the following: the second section briefly reviews 
the main literature on IMC, the third section provides a contextual backdrop for the 
Italian case, the fourth section describes the methodology of the research, and the fifth 
section highlights the main findings of the research. The last section offers some 
concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Inter-municipal cooperation 
 
A theoretical backdrop 
The topic of IMC has gained momentum in the scientific debate over the last ten years. 
The economic and fiscal crisis that began in 2008 brought tensions in government 
finances and the resulting austerity policies have heightened the need for local 
governments to rethink their services in order to increase their efficiency (Bel & 
Warner, 2015; Meneguzzo et al., 2013). Mandatory IMC is one of the policies 
traditionally proposed to reduce local governments’ spending. Specifically, there are 
two main perspectives by which IMC has been approached.  
The first took a policy-making perspective. Within this mainstream, some 
studies looked at IMC as a mode of public service delivery to be compared with other 
possible institutional arrangements, such as, for example, privatization and contracting 
out (e.g. Bel et al., 2010; Mohr et al., 2010) or amalgamation (e.g. Dollery et al., 2009; 
Hanes, 2015; Reingewertz, 2012). Some other studies investigated the effects of IMC 
on democracy and subsidiarity (Mäeltsemees et al., 2013) and the role that incentives 
have played for prompting IMC (Sorrentino & Simonetta, 2013); on this matter, several 
studies (e.g. Osterrieder et al., 2006; Parrado Díez, 2006) highlighted that legislation 
and incentives can draw opportunities and constraints for cooperation and make some 
institutional arrangements more interesting than others.  
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The second perspective looked at the governance of IMC (e.g. Bock, 2006; 
Goldkind & Pardasani, 2012; Graddy & Chen, 2006; Sancton, 2005; Sørensen, 2007). 
Here, the possibility to reduce coordination and transactional costs with effective 
governance is one of the main triggers behind the positive inclination towards IMC. A 
comparative research on IMC in eight European countries showed a great variety of 
solutions for cooperation across the different countries (Hulst & van Montfort, 2012); in 
this respect, according to Hulst et al. (2009, p. 279), “it is the interaction between 
external factors, the institutional context and the preference structures of local 
government that in the end determines the pattern of cooperation and the shifts 
therein”. IMC has also been investigated in the literature as an example of public 
network governance. Public networks could be defined as “more or less stable patterns 
of social relations between mutually dependent actors formed around policy problems 
and/or clusters of means and which are created, maintained, and changed through a 
series of games” (Klijn, 1996, p. 97). Within this approach, there is a large amount of 
public administration literature, focusing, for example, on the mediating role of 
governance structures for determining public network performance (Provan & Milward, 
1995; Provan & Sebastian, 1998). This work intends to consider both of these 
approaches, considering on one hand the expectations of the policy makers (first of all, 
the expected costs reduction) and on the other hand looking at the different forms of 
governance of IMC that have been chosen by the Italian municipalities. 
 
Features of successful IMC 
Regardless of the perspective taken, one of the main topics that commonly challenges 
scholars is that of performance of IMC. Drawing from earlier studies on public 
networks (Cristofoli et al., 2011; Niaounakis, T. & Blank, J., 2017; Provan & Milward, 
2001; Turrini et al., 2010; Voets et al., 2008), we identify three main kinds of 
dimensions for successful IMC: higher efficiency in service delivery; better 
effectiveness in service delivery; and higher institutional legitimacy in negotiating and 
in engaging with other governmental entities. Considering the better effectiveness in 
service delivery, the presence of personnel potentially more specialized thanks to IMC 
and the ability to expand services provided only in some municipalities, even to small 
municipalities that lacked them, play a fundamental role. In this regard, the IMC toolkit 
manual (Council of Europe et al., 2010, p. 10) provides the following example: "In 
many countries, services for children and older people are not provided at all, nor is it 
realistic to expect these municipalities to introduce such services by themselves. "About 
the third dimension of successful IMC, drawing from Suchman (1995, p. 574), we 
define institutional legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that 
organizational activities are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. Institutional legitimacy is 
quite important in the current context of multi-level governance settings (Hooghe & 
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Marks, 2001), because it may influence the ability of municipalities to get more funds 
from upper levels of government.  
Regarding features of successful IMC, we focused our analysis on four 
variables: geographical area, type of inter-municipal integration, size, and the presence 
in the IMC of a bigger municipality (more than 5,000 inhabitants, the so-called big 
brother) which was not formally obliged to join the IMC. 
As far as geographical area is concerned, several authors highlighted that 
positive outcomes are easier to reach in communities with higher levels of trust in 
government and social capital with members who recognize the value of collaboration 
and participate in public activities (e.g. Conrad et al., 2003; Mitchell et al., 2002). 
Taking geographical area as a predictor of successful IMC is very important when 
considering the Italian context, as there are many differences within Italian regions in 
terms of social capital, institutional performance (e.g. Putnam et al., 2004; Weil & 
Putnam, 1994), and efficiency of public administration (D’Amuri & Giorgiantonio, 
2016; Giordano & Tommasino, 2011; International Monetary Fund, 2015). In all the 
cases cited, public administration in Northern Italy performs better than in Central Italy 
and especially than in Southern Italy. 
The organizational structure for IMC is another important issue. More 
specifically, the literature tends to distinguish between service delivery organizations 
and service delivery agreements (e.g. Hulst & Van Montfort, 2007; Rodrigues et al., 
2012; Tavares & Camões, 2007). Service delivery organizations are second-level 
institutions aimed at delivering public services. They have delegated decision-making 
and authority from the cooperating municipalities. Conversely, service delivery 
agreements are based on the cooperation among municipalities through an agreement 
and without the creation of any second-level organization; in some cases, the agreement 
may require one of the partners, usually the largest municipality, to act as the lead 
organization. Service delivery organizations can prompt better integration, but can also 
lead to higher political transactional costs. According to Hulst et al. (2009, p. 278), 
“Using contractual agreements, municipalities can avoid the start-up costs and costs 
related to the governance and management of a joint organization and still create the 
same economies of scale. As mentioned earlier, formal procedures for the establishment 
of joint organizations, joint management, and provisions for control and accountability 
of local councils involve additional costs.” On the other hand, this flexibility may also 
be a disadvantage, as Spicer (2014, p. 253) points out that “interlocal agreements do not 
necessarily provide stable administration since their terms and conditions are subject to 
periodic renegotiation.” 
In some cases, municipalities may decide to adopt a hybrid organizational form: 
some services delivered via SDA and others that are delivered via SDO.  
Size is also another important variable to be considered for analyzing IMC (e.g. 
Dixit, 1973; Hirsch, 1959). According to economic theory, increasing the size of the 
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provider of public services would allow partners to realize economies of scale, 
economies of scope, and economies of density. As Bel et al. (2015, p. 56) point out, 
those around economies of scale are the most important efficiency motivations for IMC. 
In this work, consistent with the objective of providing policy guidance for the IMC, 
authors have distinguished between micro (fewer than 1,000 inhabitants) and small 
(from 1,001 to 5,000 inhabitants). 
Finally, linked to size there is the presence or not in the IMC of a bigger 
municipality not obliged by law to participate in the IMC. In this respect, previous 
studies on IMC (Giacomini et al., 2015; Hulst et al., 2009) have shown positive effects 
from the presence of a “big brother” in the IMC. In addition, studies on contract 
management capacity in municipal and county governments found how governments 
that have small popul tions and are more isolated from metropolitan areas have fewer 
capacity investments and can therefore be favoured by a collaboration with larger 
municipalities with more expertise (Brown & Potoski, 2003). Hence, we decided to 
include in our analysis also this fourth predictor as the support from a bigger town 
should allow the small towns to benefit from economies of specialization already 
obtained by the “big brother”.  
However, it is important to highlight that in some cases IMC can be a source of 
inefficiencies and performance worsening. According to Feiock (Feiock, 2013; Feiock 
& Scholz, 2010), delegation of service responsibilities to an array of local authorities 
can improve resilience and attention to local needs, but it can also create the so-called 
institutional collective action (ICA) dilemmas. A horizontal collective action problem 
arises when governments are too large or too small to efficiently deliver on their own a 
service or if the service produces effects that spill across administrative boundaries. 
Hence, IMC is a mechanism that can potentially mitigate a horizontal manifestation of 
an ICA dilemma, but the benefits associated with IMC are not always superior to the 
diseconomies and inefficiencies related to the involvement of multiple actors. It should 
not be forgotten that the presence of more municipalities involved in public service 
provision can lead to high political transaction costs, as Bel and Warner (2015) have 
pointed out in the case of municipally owned companies with multi-government 
ownership. On the same topic, Sørensen (2007) found, analyzing the case of refuse 
collection in Norway, that efficiency losses owing to many owners are greater than the 
cost reductions obtained by pursuing economy of scale. On the same line, Voorn et al. 
(2017) highlighted, through a systematic review of previous studies, that more 
ownership dispersion implies a higher risk of failure. Briefly, in some cases IMC cannot 
work because individual municipalities, adopting opportunistic behaviours, can reduce 
the potential benefits of collaboration. 
 
3. Inter-municipal cooperation in Italy 
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The debate on IMC for public service delivery is very topical across Europe, and it has 
recently gained momentum also in Italy. In Italy there are more than 8,000 
municipalities, of which 70% are so-called “small municipalities” with a population of 
fewer than 5,000 inhabitants; in these towns live 17% of the total Italian population 
(Giacomini, 2017). 
Italian municipalities are particularly relevant for local economies and supply 
several important public services for citizens, such as social services, urban planning, 
waste disposal, water and energy supply, nursery schools, policing, and many leisure 
services (e.g. swimming pools, local museums, and theatres). During the last decades, 
different laws have been issued on IMC. The latest law was the law no. 95/2012. This 
law, also called “Spending Review”, has forced municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants 
(3,000 for those operating in mountain regions) to the joint provision of public services 
in some core functions. The final version of the law established that municipalities have 
to meet the obligation of inter-municipal cooperation for the following functions 
(numbering as per the Italian law): 
a)  general administration, financial and spending management and control; 
b)  management of public and welfare services in the municipalities, including 
public transport;  
c)  land charges register management, apart from the functions employed by the 
State in accordance with the current regulation; 
d)  urban and housing planning in the municipality and participation in territorial 
planning at a supra-municipal level; 
e)  planning, civil protection, and first-aid coordination activities within the 
municipality; 
f)  organization and management of garbage collection and disposal service, and 
related tax collecting; 
g) local social service planning, management, and delivery to the citizens; 
h)  school building (for the part Provinces are not entrusted with), planning and 
management of school services; 
i)  municipal and local administrative police; 
l)  general registry, electoral and statistics offices management, for the functions 
carried out on the part of and for the central government; and 
l bis) statistical services. 
 
The mandatory introduction of IMC in Italy was inspired by the increasing need to cut 
public expenditures (Giacomini, 2016). More specifically, the Italian government gave 
the opportunity to small municipalities to implement public networks for service 
delivery through the creation of a third legal entity (“Unione dei Comuni”) or through 
the establishment of an agreement (“Convenzione”). Unioni dei Comuni are a form of 
IMC established for the first time by law no.142/1990. They are a new local authority 
Page 7 of 31
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ijpsm
International Journal of Public Sector Management
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Public Sector Management
(the so-called “service delivery organization”) with their own legal power and structure. 
Convenzioni are the easiest and most flexible type of association (the so-called “service 
delivery agreements”) aimed at cooperation among local authorities: they are highly 
adaptable and consist of contractual agreements signed by two or more local authorities 
with the purpose of cooperating for the delivery of public services. Small Italian 
municipalities depending on the public services associated can opt for establishing a 
service delivery organization (Unione dei Comuni), service delivery agreements 
(Convenzioni), or mixed solutions (Unione dei Comuni for some public services and 
Convenzioni for other public services).  
 
 
4. Methods 
This paper studies the effects of IMC in the context of small Italian municipalities. As 
in other studies (e.g. Steiner, 2003), we distinguished between successful and 
unsuccessful experiences of IMC by relying upon the perception of the reform adopters. 
Specifically, we collected information about IMC in small Italian municipalities from 
chief financial officers (CFOs). In this respect, even if responses can be influenced by 
cognitive and personal bias, the detection of significant accounting data on a large scale 
will be possible only in the next few years. Also, the concept of success needs to be 
contextualized; as mentioned above, we focused on three different elements of “IMC 
success”: higher efficiency in service delivery; better effectiveness in service delivery; 
and higher institutional legitimacy in negotiating and in engaging with other 
governmental entities. The independent variables tested were: size (micro-
municipalities with under 1,000 inhabitants and small municipalities 1,001–5,000), 
geographic area (North, Center, and South), the presence of a big brother (the presence 
in the IMC of a municipality with more than 5,000 inhabitants), and the type of inter-
municipal cooperation (service delivery agreements, service delivery organization, or 
mixed arrangements). 
Data were gathered from a mail survey that was sent to a random sample of 
1,360 chief financial officers acting in municipalities under 5,000 inhabitants, stratified 
by size (0–1,000 and 1,001–5,000) and geographic area (North, Center, and South) 
criteria. The questionnaire consisted of five simple closed-ended questions, the first two 
on the characteristics of the inter-municipality (the first one on the IMC type and the 
other on the presence of the big brother), and the other three aimed at verifying the 
different elements of “IMC success” mentioned above (higher efficiency in service 
delivery, better effectiveness in service delivery, higher institutional legitimacy). The 
possible answers about the achievement of the three IMC effects were: Yes/No/Do not 
know. The questionnaires were previously pilot-tested by several small municipalities. 
The response rate obtained was 21% (280 responses).  
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The aim of our analysis is to identify the independent variables with the highest 
explanatory power as determinants or not of a particular attribute. Since the dependent 
variables are dichotomous (the occurrence or non-occurrence of the benefit), the 
methodology that best meets our needs is logistic regression, a special case of 
generalized linear model developed for binary response variables. 
 
 
5. Findings 
CFOs were queried with respect to three potential rewards of IMC: reducing costs 
(efficiency), better public services (effectiveness), and greater institutional legitimacy. It 
has to be remembered that, owing to the lack of reliable data to evaluate the effects of 
intercommunal cooperation on a large number of municipalities, the following data refer 
to perceptions of CFOs, with all the limitations related to the detection of subjective 
perceptions. In the first sub-paragraph the overall results are shown, while in the second 
sub-paragraph the results of a more analytical analysis using logistic regression are 
reported. In the appendix are reported the N distribution of the responses and the 
synopsis of the findings. 
 
Main effects of IMC 
As shown in table 1, reductions in costs and improvements in the delivery of public 
services were detected in almost two municipalities out of three, whereas greater 
institutional legitimacy was detected in 40% of cases. 
 
Table 1. “Main effects of IMC”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the geographical area, the IMC type, the size, and the IMC 
membership (the presence or not of the so-called “big brother”), some interesting trends 
also emerge. Looking at the main effects of IMC considering the geographical area in 
Italy (North, Center, and South) where IMC was implemented, as we can see from 
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figure 1, small Italian municipalities from the Center that participated in IMC seem to 
have greater benefits in terms of better public services (especially) and greater 
institutional legitimacy. Moreover, differences in institutional legitimacy after 
implementing IMC seem particularly relevant looking at the different results of Central 
and Southern municipalities compared to those in the North.  
 
 
Figure 1. “Geographical area and main effects of IMC” 
 
 
Considering the relationship between the main effects of IMC and the type of IMC 
implemented, we can see from figure 2 that service delivery organizations show better 
results with all the three kinds of effects considered. More specifically, considerable 
differences have been detected on the issue of costs reduction: mixed arrangements – 
whereby some public services are delivered through service delivery agreements and 
other public services through a service delivery organization – result in costs reduction 
in 53% of cases, and SDA results in costs reduction in 59% of cases, whereas costs 
reduction occurs in 80% of cases when IMC is implemented through a SDO. Looking at 
all the three benefits obtainable, the improved performance in the municipalities that 
have adopted a SDO clearly emerges. It should also be noted that the SDAs have little 
effectiveness in obtaining greater institutional legitimacy; however, a SDA could be not 
helpful in increasing the institutional weight as the municipalities remain totally 
autonomous and no entity is created to represent them jointly (as opposed to the SDOs). 
The worst results in terms of costs reduction emerge instead in mixed forms. Their 
heterogeneity in the delivery of services restricts factors that favor the effectiveness of 
inter-municipal cooperation. In this respect, as highlighted by Niaounakis and Blank 
(2017), more research on the relationship between flexible structures of inter-municipal 
cooperation, efficiency, and the quality of service delivery is needed. 
 
 
Figure 2. “IMC type and main effects of IMC” 
 
Looking to the size, small municipalities (1,000–5,000 inhabitants) compared to 
micro-municipalities (fewer than 1,000 inhabitants) seem to benefit more in terms of 
better public services and greater institutional legitimacy; as concerns costs reduction, 
no significant differences between small and micro-municipalities were found. 
 
 
Figure 3. “Size and main effects of IMC” 
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The last variable taken into account deals with IMC membership, i.e. the presence in 
the IMC of a big brother that is a municipality with more than 5,000 inhabitants (and so, 
according to Italian law, not formally obliged to implement IMC). The results in figure 
4 below show a slight tendency to have better results with regard to better public 
services when a big brother is participating in IMC.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. “IMC membership and main effects of IMC” 
 
 
Logistic regression 
So far we have looked at the relationship existing between the main effects of IMC and 
the other four independent variables (size; geographical area; type of inter-municipal 
cooperation; IMC membership) taking a binary perspective. Below we have considered 
the three effects (costs reduction; better public services; greater institutional legitimacy) 
separately, and for each of them we have estimated a logistic regression model. In the 
comments we highlighted for which explanatory variables the estimated coefficient is 
statistically significant, distinguishing the degree of significance by the p-value 
associated with it: ** – very significant where p-value < 0.01, ‘*’ – significant where 
0.01 ≤	p-value < 0.05, ‘.’ – small significance where 0.05 ≤	p-value < 0.1, ‘’ – not 
significant where p-value ≥ 0.1. 
The first logistic regression model refers to better services (effectiveness of 
IMC). We tested the four independent variables. Looking at table 2, it is possible to note 
that only some of the considered independent variables are statistically significant, that 
is they play an important role in discriminating whether a municipality belongs to one 
of the two groups of observations (municipalities that have shown an improvement in 
services and municipalities that have not detected it).  
 
Table 2. Logistic regression model for “better services”  
 
** – very significant,  ‘*’ – significant,  ‘.’ – small significance,  ‘’ – not significant 
 
The second logistic regression model refers to cost reduction (efficiency of IMC). In 
this case, the role of any of the four independent variables in affecting the realization or 
not of the expected benefit is not highlighted through the logistic regression model. 
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Table 3. Logistic regression model for “cost reduction”  
 
** – very significant,  ‘*’ – significant,  ‘.’ – small significance,  ‘’ – not significant 
 
The third logistic regression model points again to the importance of the IMC type for 
achieving a greater institutional legitimacy. In this case, the model identifies a single 
strong relationship: the municipalities that have chosen as the type of IMC a service 
delivery organization have a higher probability of realizing a greater institutional 
legitimacy than those who chose a service delivery agreement. 
 
Table 4. Logistic regression model for “greater institutional legitimacy”  
 
** – very significant, ‘*’ – significant,  ‘.’ – small significance,  ‘’ – not significant 
 
 
Finally, considering all together the three positive effects after the introduction of IMC, 
our data show that 32% of municipalities detected all three improvements. We did 
another logistic regression analysis to see which among the independent variables 
statistically associate with the group of municipalities that achieved all three 
improvements, and we found that the adoption of a service delivery organization is 
statistically relevant.  
 
 
Table 5. Logistic regression model for “all the positive effects achieved”  
 
** – very significant,  ‘*’ – significant,  ‘.’ – small significance,  ‘’ – not significant 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions  
This paper discusses the effects of mandatory IMC in small Italian municipalities. Our 
research showed that, according to our empirical context and our observations (N=280), 
IMC seems to confirm policy makers’ expectations of costs reduction and better public 
services in two thirds of the small municipalities that have implemented IMC, and in 
one case out of two it seems to lead towards a greater institutional legitimacy.  
Specifically, the aim of our research was that of identifying factors for 
successful IMC, operationalized with three dimensions: higher efficiency (costs 
reduction), better effectiveness of local public services, and greater institutional 
legitimacy, in a setting rarely examined by the existing literature, that of small and 
micro-municipalities (i.e. municipalities with between 1,001 and 5,000 inhabitants and 
fewer than 1,000 inhabitants, respectively).  
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Our statistical analysis with logistic regression highlighted that IMC type is 
particularly critical for explaining successful IMC. In particular, positive effects of IMC 
were mainly detected in those small municipalities that promoted a service delivery 
organization rather than participating in service delivery agreements or opting for mixed 
arrangements of joint public services delivery. It is important to emphasize how the 
creation of a stable entity that operates in the place of individual municipalities 
diminishes the direct control of individual municipalities. The presence of an over-
municipal entity reduces (but does not eliminate) the so-called political transaction costs 
associated with multi-government ownership (Bel & Warner, 2015). These costs, 
however, remain extremely high in SDAs. With regard to the better services, it is 
conceivable that more stable forms of cooperation can easily lead to the standardization 
of the services provided and to the extension of some services to the associated 
municipalities where those services were absent. In other words, our study seems to 
confirm that more stable forms of cooperation can enhance trust, reduce transaction cost 
(e.g. Tavares and Camões, 2007) and improve the level of services provided although 
this preliminary result needs further investigation with accounting data and not only by 
relying upon the perception of the reform adopters. This result seems to confirm what 
have stated: when the number of previous stable collaborations between any given local 
governments is high, the transaction costs envisaged in a further collaboration remain 
low and the expected benefits of this collaboration are high. 
The other three independent variables (size, geographical area, and IMC 
membership) had more limited significance in explaining the success or not of IMC. 
Contrary to what was found in previous research (Giacomini, 2015; Hulst et al., 2009), 
the presence in the established IMC of a larger municipality does not seem to bring 
significant advantages.  
In terms of policy implications, these results point to the importance of creating 
more stable forms of cooperation, such as service delivery organizations, when small 
municipalities are involved in IMC. This is particularly relevant in our times of 
austerity, considering that many European countries have an average municipal 
population below 10,000 inhabitants (for example and among the others Germany, 
France, and Spain – see Teles, 2016) and may therefore consider implementing IMC as 
a solution to realize some of the effects investigated in this paper. In terms of research 
implications, we aim to follow up longitudinally the effects of IMC in small Italian 
municipalities as well as investigate the effects of IMC considering different types of 
public services. In this respect, future comparative studies as well as platforms for the 
exchange of learning and evidence will be particularly important to follow the 
phenomenon of IMC across countries.  
As any piece of research, this paper study limitations. The results are 
exploratory in nature and may reflect the specific country, type, and size of government 
where the analysis was performed, as well as the subjective interpretations of the 
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respondents. As mentioned above, CFO perceptions have been measured, as precise 
data of the implemented inter-municipality are not yet available. Doubtless, this is a 
limitation of this study. For this reason, the study should be expanded to include 
objective data and performance measures of the IMC as soon as available. By 
combining qualitative judgments, financial parameters, and non-financial measures 
(Jones & Pendlebury, 2010), it will be possible to get a more complete representation of 
the effects of mandatory inter-municipal cooperation. In particular, a promising area to 
explore could be the relationship between the types of inter-municipality cooperation 
and the quality of service delivery, and its effects on institutional legitimacy. 
Furthermore, in addition to the variables considered, the relationship between network 
structure, mechanisms and managers that jointly affects network performance 
(Cristofori et al., 2015) needs to be approached. Finally yet importantly, the accounting 
and accountability mechanisms have to be studied as often overlooked in the discussion 
on inter-municipal cooperation are concerns related to transparency. We believe that 
these paths can be a basis for future and even more deep investigation into the features 
of successful IMC processes. 
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Table 6: “N distribution of the IMC effects” 
 
Table 7: “Synopsis of our findings” 
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Figure 3. “Size and main effects of IMC”  
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Figure 4. “IMC membership and main effects of IMC”  
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Table 7: “Synopsis of our findings”  
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